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Policymakers and the public are concerned about the role of medical malpractice liability in the rising
cost of medical care.  We use variation in the generosity of local juries to identify the causal impact
of malpractice liability on medical costs, mortality, and social welfare.  The effect of malpractice on
medical costs is large relative to its share of medical expenditures, but relatively modest in absolute
terms—growth in malpractice payments over the last decade and a half contributed at most 5.0% to
the total real growth in medical expenditures, which topped 33% over this period.  On the other side
of the ledger, malpractice liability leads to modest reductions in patient mortality; the value of these
more than likely exceeds the cost impacts of malpractice liability.  Therefore, policies that reduce expected
malpractice costs are unlikely to have a major impact on health care spending for the average patient,
and are also unlikely to be cost-effective over conventionally accepted ranges for the value of a statistical
life.
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A.  Introduction  
Both physicians and the broader public identify the spiraling costs of malpractice insurance and 
lawsuits as a major problem facing the US health care system (cf, Blendon et al., 2002).  
Physician groups such as the American Medical Association have advocated federal limits on the 
damages that can be assessed in malpractice cases.  Republican senators, governors, and even 
presidents, have echoed this sentiment, and repeatedly pointed to rising malpractice costs as a 
major driver of growth in health care spending.
1 Even many Democratic politicians who oppose 
limits on damages show little faith in the present tort liability system.  For instance, President 
Obama has expressed opposition to damage caps, but he and Senator Hilary Clinton have 
identified the current liability environment as a major contributor to adverse outcomes for 
patients (Clinton and Obama, 2006). 
The hardened political lines around malpractice reform belie major gaps in our 
understanding of the issue.  Both the CBO (2006) and the GAO (1999) have concluded that the 
overall effects of malpractice exposure on total health spending and outcomes are simply not 
known.
2  Fueling the political debate have been several apparently contradictory facts about 
malpractice.  Opponents of malpractice reform often note that malpractice payments are a 
relatively small fraction – between 1 and 2 percent – of total expenditures on physicians.  
However, supporters of reform point to the recent and dramatic rise in malpractice costs, as 
documented in Figure 1 (also see Mello et al., 2003).  According to data from the National 
                                                 
1 President Bush reiterated his longstanding position in the 2007 State of the Union Address. 
2 Two recent papers by Baicker and Chandra (2006; 2007) — post-dating the CBO and 
GAO reports — tackle the overall effects.  Using cross-sectional and longitudinal variation by 
state, they find that malpractice risk has little impact on total costs, but substantial impacts on 
specific procedures, like medical imaging.  As Baicker and Chandra note, however, a strategy for 
causal inference is required, in order to elicit the policy implications of these relationships.  
2 
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), from 1991 to 2002 physicians’ real annual medical malpractice 
payments grew from $2.3 billion to $3.8 billion (65% growth).
3  Over the same time period, real 
health expenditures on physician services grew from $221 billion to $325 billion (47% growth).
4  
Moreover, previous research provides a mechanism for even modest malpractice payments to 
have a disproportionately large effect on total medical costs. Using data on elderly heart attack 
patients, Kessler and McClellan (1996; 2002a; 2002b) find that the threat of liability from 
medical malpractice causes doctors to practice “defensive medicine,” performing extraneous 
(and expensive) tests and medical procedures to ward off the possibility of a malpractice suit.   
The identification of “defensive medicine” by Kessler and McClellan has been confirmed 
and deepened by a number of important studies.  For instance, Currie and MacLeod (2008) 
recently demonstrated that tort reforms impact the behavior of obstetricians both in the large and 
even in subtly predictable ways.  Baicker and Chandra (2007) find evidence that malpractice 
pressure is associated with more diagnostic imaging.  Other work has identified a relationship 
between malpractice costs on the use of obstetric and pre-natal procedures (Tussing et al., 1994; 
Corrigan et al., 1996; Dubay et al., 1999; Dubay et al., 2001), more general medical practices 
(Bovbjerg et al., 1996), and the labor supply of physicians (Encinosa and Hellinger, 2005; 
Kessler et al., 2005; Klick and Stratmann, 2007; Matsa, 2007; Helland and Showalter, 2008).
5   
While the mechanisms from malpractice to medical care have been carefully established, 
the overall welfare consequences of reducing malpractice costs have not been as well 
documented, for two reasons.  First, much of the causal research on defensive medicine has 
                                                 
3 The malpractice payment figures are conservative, because they omit payments made by a 
state fund, and not all payments appear in the NPDB (Government Accounting Office, 2000). 
4 Health expenditures are from the Census Bureau’s Statistical Abstract of the United States.  
5 In contrast, however, other research has found that malpractice premium growth does not 
adversely affect the net income of physicians (Pauly et al., 2006).  
3 
justifiably focused on particular kinds of patients, so as to homogenize the study population.  For 
example, Kessler and McClellan caution that their studies were designed not to estimate the 
impact of malpractice risk on total medical spending, but rather the impacts on the treatment, 
costs, and outcomes of heart attack patients (Kessler and McClellan, 1996; Kessler and 
McClellan, 2002a; Kessler and McClellan, 2002b).  Other researchers have focused on different 
subpopulations like expectant mothers (cf, Dubay et al., 1999; Currie and MacLeod, 2008).  
Unfortunately, the effects of malpractice are not always uniform and are difficult to generalize 
across the population (Congressional Budget Office, 2006). 
Second, the dominant identification strategy to date has relied upon state-level tort 
reform.  The empirical evidence supports tort reform’s validity in the frequently studied contexts 
of heart attack patients and expectant mothers (cf, Kessler and McClellan, 2002a; Currie and 
MacLeod, 2008).  However, questions have been raised about validity in the study of overall 
medical costs and outcomes.  Danzon (2000) argues that states with managed care may have 
been more likely to adopt tort reform measures, and that the cost savings attributed to tort reform 
could be a result of managed care itself.
6  In the context of overall costs, the CBO finds empirical 
evidence consistent with this argument:  reform states are more likely to have slower growth in 
total health care spending prior to the reform’s adoption (Congressional Budget Office, 2006). 
In this paper, we attempt to quantify the social welfare effects of medical malpractice, 
and to do so with a new identification strategy.  Our strategy relies on changes over time in the 
generosity of local juries.  Using this approach, we find that malpractice risk increases medical 
spending in the aggregate, above and beyond its direct effects, but the total impact on overall 
                                                 
6 However, also see Arlen and MacLeod (2005), who point out that managed care 
organizations are generally not held liable for physician negligence.  
4 
medical costs is relatively modest.  A ten percent reduction in malpractice costs would reduce 
total health care expenditures by, at most, 1.2 percent.  During the malpractice “crisis” of the 
1990s, we predict this would have added about 5 percent to real hospital expenditure growth, 
which exceeded 33% over this period.  Using the same identification strategy, we find that, on 
the margin, 10 percent increases in malpractice costs reduce mortality by a modest amount, 
approximately 0.2%.  Using values of a statistical life most commonly adopted by US regulators, 
the value of the mortality decline more than likely outweighs the increase in medical costs.  On 
balance, reducing malpractice costs is more likely to harm than improve social welfare. 
We proceed as follows.  In Section B, we present our framework for analysis.  Section C 
describes our data sources.  Section D investigates issues of measurement and identification.  
Section E presents our results for costs, mortality, and overall welfare.  Finally, we conclude 
with a discussion of directions for future research. 
B.  Analytical Approach 
B.1  Theoretical Background 
Our approach to welfare can be summarized in a stylized model with a single composite health 
care output, q.  The medical cost of this output is  ) (q c .  Total malpractice payments to patients, 
MedMal, vary with output, since providers can be sued for the failure to diagnose, treat, or treat 
appropriately (Kessler and McClellan, 1996).  Therefore, the equilibrium value of q depends on 
providers’ expectations about malpractice payments,
7 which in turn depend on an exogenous 
variable  X .   
                                                 
7 Specifically, quantity depends on the uninsured portion of expected malpractice costs, 
since fully insured providers have no incentives to reduce the probability of lawsuits.  This  
5 
Malpractice payments themselves represent a pure transfer between providers and 
patients.  However, several studies have concluded that the deadweight costs of litigation are 
approximately equal to payments to victims (Kakalik and Pace, 1986; Studdert et al., 2006).
8  
Therefore, we approximate the expected social cost of medical care, including malpractice, as: 
  {} { } { } ) ( ) , ( ) , ( q c E X q MedMal E X q SC E + =  (1) 


















































The first right-hand term (equal to unity) is the direct effect of malpractice, holding behavior 
constant.  The second captures the indirect effects on quantity often labeled “defensive 























































The “direct” component of the elasticity equals the share of malpractice in total medical costs.  
An elasticity larger than this indicates the presence of an indirect behavioral effect. 
 If  ) (q V  is the gross value of output to the representative consumer, we can write the 
causal effect of expected malpractice cost on net social welfare as: 
                                                                                                                                                             
distinction is less relevant for hospitals, 40% of whom are self-insured (GAO, 2003).  However, 
even market insurance fails to cover the substantial time and reputational costs associated with 
being sued (Kessler and McClellan, 2002b; Currie and MacLeod, 2008).
7 
8 While the social cost of out-of-court settlements are likely lower than that of litigation, we 
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 (4) 
The first term is the gross value (if any) of the additional output induced by malpractice.  Due to 
the relatively high economic value of life and the difficulty of measuring morbidity, we focus on 
mortality as a single index of health care output.
9  To evaluate welfare consequences, we assess 
whether the expected cost of malpractice in dollars per life saved is larger or smaller than the 
(approximately constant) dollar value of a life to society, or: 





































B.2  Estimation Approach 
The welfare criterion in expression 5 depends on the ratio between the cost effect of malpractice, 
and its mortality effect.  Estimating these two quantities is complicated by reverse causality and 
measurement error.  If defensive medicine is effective, areas with high medical costs (or better 
health outcomes) may have fewer lawsuits, precisely because providers are responding to 
malpractice incentives.  This reverse causality problem may bias ordinary least squares estimates 
towards zero.  In addition, providers respond not to actual malpractice cost, but to expected 
malpractice costs, which are unobservable.  The resulting measurement error reinforces the 
problem of reverse causality by biasing estimated coefficients towards zero. 
                                                 
9 In this respect, we follow Kessler and McClellan (1996).  
7 
B.2.1  Empirical Framework 
To address reverse causality and measurement error, we employ instrumental variables models 
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*  is the expected direct cost of malpractice in county c at time t .  Providers’ 
behavior depends upon their expectations about malpractice costs, rather than the realized costs 
in any given period.  While these are unobserved, we proxy for currently expected malpractice 
costs using past malpractice jury awards, and specifically, a moving average of past awards, 
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10   ct Z  is our instrument, which is discussed below.   t c X ,
v
 is a vector of other county 
characteristics, including county demographics and the composition of cases (timed to coincide 
with  ) ( , i t c V MA − ).   c φ  and  t γ  are county and year fixed-effects, respectively.  For some 
specifications, we run models at the hospital-, rather than county-level.  These incorporate 
hospital, rather than county, fixed-effects.   
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*
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As long as the instrument  ct Z  satisfies standard validity conditions, we can consistently estimate 
the extra medical cost incurred per life saved.  This is the key welfare parameter on the left-hand 
                                                 
10 An alternative proxy would be total payments, including settlements.  Unfortunately, 
settlement data are not available at the county-level.  Below, we present evidence that, at the 
state-level, jury awards perform reasonably well at predicting total settlements.  
8 
side of expression 5.  In other words, estimation of the welfare parameter is robust to the error in 
measuring expected malpractice costs. 
  If the instrument satisfies the stronger condition of orthogonality to the measurement 
error  ct e , we can also recover consistent estimates of  1 β .  If this stronger condition fails to be 
met, the IV model will overstate the impact of malpractice on the outcome variables. All these 
results are proven in Appendix A. 
B.2.2  Approach to Identification 
Increases in the generosity of local juries will tend to shift out expected malpractice costs.  Total 
jury awards consist of three components:  economic damages, noneconomic damages, and 
punitive damages.  Economic damages represent concrete, measurable losses to the plaintiff, 
including lost wages, medical costs, and other out-of-pocket costs.  Since these incorporate 
medical costs directly, we might be concerned that local trends in medical costs will drive 
economic damages in an empirically problematic fashion.  Punitive damages, very rare in 
malpractice cases, are also less relevant. 
  Noneconomic damages, in contrast, compensate a plaintiff for his/her unquantifiable 
“pain and suffering.”  We argue that, when juries value the severity of this suffering, their 
determinations are plausibly exogenous to local trends in medical costs, care, and outcomes.  
Therefore, as our instrument, we use  ) ( , i t c Nonecon MA − , past trends in mean noneconomic 
damage awards per plaintiff victory, in county c.  If the instrument is valid, unusually rapid 
growth in noneconomic damage awards will lead to growth in expected malpractice payments, 
but growth in medical costs, care, and outcomes will not cause changes in noneconomic 
damages.  To support validity, we provide the following pieces of evidence.  
9 
1.  Noneconomic damage awards are statistically unrelated to past and current trends in 
medical costs and mortality (Section D.2.1). 
2.  Current and past noneconomic damage awards predict future trends in medical costs 
and mortality (Section D.2.1). 
3.  Past growth in noneconomic damage awards is correlated with increases in the 
propensity of patients to file malpractice claims against providers (Section D.3). 
4.  Past growth in noneconomic damages is correlated with higher malpractice premia 
(Section D.3). 
Finally, we address a specific threat to validity.  If jurors use simple “rules of thumb” to 
construct noneconomic damages as a mechanical function of medical costs awarded, this would 
invalidate the instrument.  We show that, while plaintiffs’ claimed medical losses are highly 
predicted of their economic damages award, they are entirely uncorrelated with the noneconomic 
damage award (Section D.2.2).  To be clear, this does not imply that noneconomic awards are 
always uncorrelated with economic awards, rather it implies that the determinants of plaintiff 
medical costs appear unrelated to pain and suffering awards.  It is the latter condition that serves 
as our identifying assumption, rather than a stronger claim about the independence between 
economic and noneconomic damage awards.   
C.   Data 
Our econometric approach requires data on jury verdicts, medical costs, mortality, and county-
level characteristics.  We measure medical costs using data from Medicare and total hospital 
spending.  These components together cover about two-thirds of health care spending exposed to 
malpractice liability.  The remainder consists of physician services paid for outside Medicare.  
10 
C.1.1  Jury Verdicts Data 
We use the RAND Jury Verdicts Database (JVDB) to recover the verdicts data.  The 
RAND JVDB contains information from 1985 to 1999 on jury verdicts occurring in all counties 
in the states of New York and California, as well as Cook County, IL (Chicago), Harris County, 
TX (Houston), King County, WA (Seattle) and the counties in the greater St. Louis, MO area 
(125 counties in all).  These data cover 23.6% of the total US population, as of the 2000 Census.  
Table 1 reports the geographic composition of the JVDB counties, ranked in decreasing order of 
population size.  The Los Angeles metro area accounts for about 15% of the population covered 
by our sample, and the New York City metro area accounts for about the same.  The cities 
outside New York and California represent about one-fifth of the data’s population weight. 
The data in the JVDB are collected from court reporter publications, trade publications 
that provide trial attorneys with information on verdicts in local courts.
11  The JVDB includes 
data on plaintiff win rates, average economic and noneconomic damage awards and type of 
injury for medical malpractice and other tort cases.  
In Table 2, we present JVDB county-level averages for:  total malpractice awards, 
malpractice awards per capita, average noneconomic damages awards per plaintiff win, and total 
jury verdict awards in all tort cases.  The columns of the table present the current year’s average 
(year t), along with 3-year moving averages, defined as the mean across years  1 − t ,  2 − t , 
                                                 
11 Some researchers have noted that jury verdict reporters do not comprehensively cover all 
verdicts (cf, Vidmar, 1994; Moller et al., 1999; Eisenberg, 2001; Seabury et al., 2004).  Earlier 
studies on the RAND JVDB used samples of public records to validate the data from several of 
the reporters used in this study. Peterson and Priest (1982) found that the Cook County Jury 
Verdict Reporter contained more than 90 percent of all verdicts in almost every year from 1960-
1978.  Shanley and Peterson (1983) found that the California Jury Verdicts Weekly contained 
more than 84 percent of 1974 and 1979 verdicts in San Francisco County.  Moreover, the 
verdicts most likely to be omitted were contract and financial injury cases, which do not enter 
into the noneconomic damages instrument or the malpractice awards measure we use.  Finally, 
verdict reporters represent a primary source of information upon which agents base expectations.  
11 
and  3 − t .  On a per capita basis, the average county hands out $2.87 in malpractice awards.  
Larger counties tend to award more per capita:  the population-weighted county average is $6.07.  
The average verdict in our sample involves a noneconomic award of $142,000, and an economic 
award of $328,000, where both means are higher on a population-weighted basis.  Malpractice 
cases involve higher verdicts, due to higher noneconomic and economic damage awards. 
C.1.2  Hospital Costs and Utilization 
Data on hospital spending, utilization, and facilities come from the American Hospital 
Association (AHA) database.  Since 1946, the AHA has conducted an annual census of its 
member hospitals.  We use data from the 1980 to 2003 survey years. 
Hospital administrators are surveyed about their total facility expenditures over the most 
recent 12-month fiscal year, available resources at the end of that 12-month reporting period, and 
resource utilization during that period.
12  Hospitals report information longitudinally.  All costs, 
here and throughout the paper, are deflated over time using the overall Consumer Price Index.
13 
The upper panel of Table 3 summarizes the expenditure and utilization data from the 
AHA survey.  Since our core regression models use the 1985-2003 data, we have restricted the 
summary statistics to cover these years.  The table shows the weighted and unweighted statistics 
over the counties in our JVDB sample, as well as the corresponding numbers for all counties.  
The average person in our sample tends to live in a county with slightly higher expenditures and 
lower utilization than the average American, but these differences are typically around 5 percent.  
While the differences are modest, the JVDB sample somewhat over-represents large counties.  
                                                 
12 In some cases, the length of reporting periods may vary, due for example to a hospital 
closure.  In these cases, we annualize the expenditure and utilization numbers, based on the 
actual length of the reporting period.   
13 For the usual well-known reasons, we do not use the medical care CPI (Boskin et al., 
1997; Berndt et al., 1998).  Therefore, our estimates include real growth in medical care costs 
compared to other goods.  
12 
Appendix B presents a formal statistical analysis demonstrating that this tendency does not alter 
our primary empirical results.  Since the data also over-represent New York and California, 
Appendix G demonstrates and discusses the similarity of our key results across California, which 
has noneconomic damage caps, and the uncapped state of New York. 
C.1.3  County-Level Medicare Costs 
From the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), we obtained county-level data on 
Medicare expenditures, from 1980 to 2003.  Based on their administrative records, CMS reports 
total Medicare Part A and B enrollees residing in a county, and total Parts A and B expenditures 
for the residents of each county.
14  Due to inconsistencies over time in the reporting of Medicare 
HMO data, we use Medicare fee-for-service expenditures and enrollees, with a focus on aged 
(not disabled or end-stage renal disease) enrollees.   
The Medicare data are summarized in the middle panel of Table 3.  Part A is the inpatient 
hospital insurance portion of Medicare that is free to all eligible Americans (over age 65 or 
disabled).  Part B covers physician visits, outpatient procedures, and diagnostic imaging.  
Eligible individuals must pay a premium for Part B, but approximately 94 percent
15 of Part A 
beneficiaries are enrolled in Part B.  Therefore, we focus on costs per enrollee, rather than 
impacts on enrollment per se.   
C.1.4  County-Level Characteristics 
Information on county-level demographics is taken from the Area Resource File (ARF).  The 
ARF collects county-level per capita income from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
                                                 
14 Ideally, we would have preferred measures of Medicare utilization by Medicare 
beneficiaries who sought care in a particular county, rather than those who live in a particular 
county.  The mismatch induces measurement error in the dependent variable. 
15 Based on CMS enrollment data from 2004, available from the authors or at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareEnRpts/Downloads/Sageall04.pdf  
13 
Local Area Income Tapes.  The data on population are from the Census Bureau, which produces 
estimates for intercensal years based on a demographic model of its own.  The vector  ct X  
includes time-varying county-level demographic characteristics:  proportion male, proportion 
black, proportion white, income per capita and its square, and proportion of the population in 5-
year age categories (one category for every five-year age interval between 0 and 85, and a single 
category for 85+).  These demographic data are summarized in the bottom panel of Table 3. 
In addition, we control for the time-varying characteristics of the county’s jury verdicts, 
based on the JVDB data, with a set of variables measuring the proportion of cases that fall into 
each of the following mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories:  no injury, physical injury 
but no permanent disability, partial disability, permanent and total disability, death, or multiple 
plaintiffs in the suit.  This accounts for changes in the severity of injuries, which might affect the 
size of awards.  These covariates appear in both the first- and second-stage models. 
D.  Measurement and Identification 
D.1  Measuring Expected Malpractice Cost 
We measure the currently expected cost of malpractice using past malpractice trial verdicts from 
the JVDB.  Even though approximately 90% of malpractice claims are settled out-of-court, this 
is theoretically plausible for two reasons.  First, necessity may dictate the use of trial verdicts in 
forecasting costs, since verdicts are publicly available, but out-of-court settlements are typically 
confidential.
16  Second, the expected size of a verdict will influence pre-trial negotiation and 
settlement.  Therefore, information about past trial verdicts may be enough to draw educated 
inferences about expected total costs, of verdicts plus settlements. 
                                                 
16 As we exploit later, state-level data on malpractice settlements are publicly available, but 
more local measures are not made public.  
14 
We think of expected costs as a function of past verdicts in a county, according to: 
  ,...), , | ( 2 , 1 , − − t c t c ct V V MedMal E  (8) 
where  i t c V − ,  represents malpractice jury verdicts in county c and time  i t − .  To assess the 
signal-to-noise ratio in this strategy, we turn to an external data source, the 1990-2005 National 
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), which reports both malpractice jury verdicts and total 
malpractice settlements, but only at the state-level.  For state s at time t, we estimate: 
  st
i





, 0  (9) 
This regression tests past jury verdicts as predictors of current malpractice payments.  Both the 
payments and verdicts variables are calculated on a per capita basis.
17 
  The results of this regression appear in Table 4, which reports models using 5 different 
specifications, differing in the included lags.  Column 1 reports a regression of  st MedMal  on 
1 , − t s V  through  6 , − t s V , and the corresponding regression of  st MedMal  on the moving average of 
1 , − t s V  through  6 , − t s V .  Similarly, column 2 repeats this for lags  1 , − t s V  through  3 , − t s V , and so forth. 
  On their own, past malpractice verdicts explain a significant amount of the variation in 
current malpractice payments.  Six lags explain 74% of variation in payments, while the first 
three lags alone explain 72%.  Even historical lags have good explanatory power:  lags 4 through 
6 explain about 66% of the variation in current malpractice payments.  This suggests that 
malpractice verdicts are defensible, if imperfect, proxies of payments. 
  Second, for all models, we cannot reject the possibility that the coefficients on all the lags 
are equal.  As a result, we cannot reject the simplest measurement strategy of using moving 
                                                 
17 This also eliminates the mechanical correlation induced by variation in population size.  
15 
averages of jury verdicts as proxies for total malpractice costs.  The regressions at the bottom of 
the table explicitly test the relationship between moving averages of verdicts, and current 
malpractice payments.  In terms of R-squared, almost nothing is lost by moving from the 
specification with individual lags to one with a combined, equal-weighted moving average. 
D.2  Instrument Validity 
As an instrument for expected malpractice costs, we use mean noneconomic damages awarded 
by juries in plaintiff victories.  The identifying assumption is the local trends in noneconomic 
damages are not caused by local trends in medical costs and outcomes, or their determinants.  
We provide evidence for this assumption, along with evidence that variation in noneconomic 
damages is relevant, in the sense that agents throughout the medical and legal systems update 
their beliefs and behavior in response to changing noneconomic damage awards. 
D.2.1  Temporal Tests of Validity 
We find that past medical costs do not affect contemporaneous or current noneconomic 
damage awards, but past noneconomic damages do affect current medical spending.  This 
suggests that causality runs from the instrument to medical spending, and not in the opposite 
(and invalid) direction. 
To implement this test, we ran reduced-form versions of the instrumental variables model 
in equations 7, where health expenditures are regressed on the (lagged values of the) instrument, 
state and year fixed-effects, and all the exogenous covariates X .  In addition to the reduced-
forms, we ran analogous models regressing current health expenditures on future values of the 
instrument, as a falsification test.  If health costs cause verdicts, we should see a relationship 
between current costs and future noneconomic awards.  Table 5 presents the results for four 
different expenditure measures as dependent variables, and one dependent variable measuring  
16 
inpatient utilization.  There are 16 regressions testing the causal link from lagged noneconomic 
damages to current medical spending (i.e., the 4 right-most columns); 11 yield significant effects 
at the 10% level.  On the other hand, only one of the 20 regressions testing the opposite effect — 
of current health care spending on the current year or leads of noneconomic damages —are 
significant.  This result is not an artifact of differences in power, since the regressions have 
narrower confidence intervals when we test for the reverse causality running from medical 
spending to noneconomic damages.  Also note that the current year regressions have the most 
power, but fail to find any significant relationship.  This is an important argument against the 
possibility that juries use current growth in medical spending as a reason to raise awards, or that 
an unobserved third factor simultaneously drives verdicts and medical spending.
18 
For utilization, we find little evidence of reverse causality, but also no reduced-form 
effects.  This is consistent with our later findings that malpractice has little estimated impact on 
inpatient utilization. 
D.2.2  Tests of Jury Behavior 
Second, we conduct a direct test of whether juries link medical costs to noneconomic 
damage awards.  According to this hypothesis, juries award noneconomic damages as a simple 
function of medical losses.  If true, high growth in medical costs would cause higher 
noneconomic damage awards.  However, we find that plaintiffs’ claimed medical losses are 
highly correlated with economic damage awards, but entirely uncorrelated with noneconomic 
damage awards.  Table 5 presents the results of this test for the 2,328 malpractice cases that 
involved a plaintiff win in our sample.
19  The first two columns of the table illustrate the 
                                                 
18 In addition, it demonstrates that serial correlation in the instrument likely does not cause 
bias by introducing a relationship from health care spending to future noneconomic damages. 
19 Mean medical costs are quantitatively insignificant for non-malpractice cases.  
17 
estimated impact of claimed economic losses on the compensatory economic award granted by 
the jury, with and without non-medical losses, respectively.  The second two columns provide 
similar estimates for the noneconomic award.   
As we would expect, claimed medical losses affect the size of the economic award.  An 
additional dollar of claimed medical and non-medical losses is associated with about a $0.34 and 
$0.22 higher award, respectively (medical and non-medical damages are jointly significant, but 
only medical losses are statistically significant on their own).  However, there is virtually no 
impact of claimed economic losses on noneconomic awards.  The point estimates are smaller by 
at least an order of magnitude, and they are not statistically significant (individually or jointly). 
D.2.3  Impact of Tort Reform 
The occurrence of tort reform generates a final potential validity issue to address.  If in 
fact tort reform is driven by overall medical expenditures, and if tort reform affects noneconomic 
damages in our data, the instrument could be compromised.  However, there are relatively few 
reforms adopted in our sampled states during the time period of study.  California has the 
strictest reforms in our sample, and perhaps in the country, but these were adopted in 1979.
20  
Missouri adopted a damage cap at the very beginning of our sample (1986), but excluding the 
initial year has no impact on our results.  Illinois adopted reform in 1987, but it was ruled 
unconstitutional that same year.  Other observed reforms likely had little effect on damage 
awards.  For example, Texas adopted a cap on punitive damages in 1995, but punitive damages 
are rare in medical malpractice cases, and should have little effect on expected payments 
(Eisenberg et al., 1997). 
                                                 
20 Conceivably, one might still be concerned that California’s noneconomic damage growth 
is systematically different than that of other states, in a way that is related to health spending.  
However, we get substantially similar results when we estimate the effects excluding all counties 
in California, a finding discussed further in Section E.3, and Appendix G.  
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D.3  Power and Relevance of the Instrument 
We begin by demonstrating a first-stage relationship between noneconomic damages and jury 
verdicts in malpractice cases.  We then provide evidence that noneconomic damages also 
influence expectations about malpractice costs, and thus provide meaningful first-stage variation. 
Table 7 displays the first-stage relationship between local trends in noneconomic 
damages, and expected malpractice costs.  The instrument is the average noneconomic damage 
award, per plaintiff win, granted by juries in the county.  The included endogenous variable is 
the total value of malpractice awards, per county resident.  The first-stage model is always run at 
the county-level.  For all the models with lagged noneconomic damages as the instrument, first-
stage power meets the “rule of thumb” suggesting a Wald statistic of 10.0 or better. 
Our first stage treatment effect is meaningful only if noneconomic awards influence 
expected malpractice costs for health care providers, insurers and patients.  First, Section D.2.1 
showed that past noneconomic damage awards predict current medical costs, but that the reverse 
is not true, consistent with the theory that provider behavior is influenced by noneconomic 
awards.  Second, to verify that noneconomic awards influence the costs expected by insurers, we 
show in Appendix D that higher past trends in county noneconomic damages raise county 
malpractice premia currently charged by insurers.  Finally, we show that noneconomic awards 
influence the behavior of patients.  Theoretically, higher noneconomic damage awards raise the 
payoff to suing a provider,
21 but only if patients believe that trends in noneconomic damages 
meaningfully predict the size of expected malpractice payments. Appendix E uses closed-claims 
data from a California malpractice insurer to verify that local growth in noneconomic damages 
                                                 
21 For a summary of the literature on tort reform and lawsuit frequency, see Studdert, 
Brennan and Mello (2004).   
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increases the probability that physicians face malpractice claims, and the probability they will 
face a claim with nonzero defense costs.  Taken together, these findings suggest that agents use 
past trends in noneconomic damages to update their expectations about malpractice cost. 
E.  Results 
E.1  Effects of Malpractice on Costs 
E.1.1  Hospital Costs 
We estimate equation 6 at the hospital level.  Since our first-stage equation for 
malpractice costs is estimated at the county-level, this requires a two-sample IV approach 
(Angrist and Krueger, 1992).  We estimate the first-stage equation, use the predicted values for 
malpractice in the second-stage, and calculate the standard errors via a bootstrap procedure.
 22 
The resulting instrumental variables estimates are given in Table 8.  We model costs per 
bed, costs per bed-day, and days per bed (in the bottom panel).
23  We think of the first as an 
overall expenditures measure, the second as a price measure, and the third as a quantity.  
Separate estimates are provided for the current measure of malpractice as well as each set of 
moving averages.  
Hospital costs account for the majority — approximately 60% — of total spending on 
hospitals, physicians, and clinical services, which represent the segment of the health care market 
                                                 
22 Specifically, we use a cluster (or “block”) bootstrap that sampled all hospitals in a given 
county for each bootstrap replication.  This embeds the underlying empirical assumptions that 
observations from different counties are statistically independent, but observations within a 
particular county exhibit dependence.  In each of 500 bootstrap replications, we run IV models 
using county population as weights:  if smaller counties have smaller hospitals with more 
variance, weighting by population mitigates the effect of heteroskedasticity on the distribution of 
the bootstrap estimator. 
23 We define bed-days as inpatient bed-days plus outpatient procedures.  Implicitly, we 
regard an outpatient procedure as filling a hospital bed for one day.  
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exposed to malpractice risk.  While the OLS models showed little relationship between 
malpractice and hospital costs, the IV models suggest that malpractice risk raises “price” and 
overall spending.  There is no significant effect on total hospital quantity, although separate 
specifications revealed that malpractice significantly reduces total inpatient days and admissions.  
The overall elasticity of the hospital cost measures with respect to lagged malpractice cost ranges 
from approximately 0.02 to 0.08.  While the elasticity for hospital costs never exceeds 0.1, it is 
considerably higher than the 0.01 or 0.02 that we would expect if we focused only on the direct 
costs of malpractice.  This indicates that there is a clear behavioral response of health care 
providers to expected malpractice risk. 
E.1.2  Medicare Costs 
Medicare costs account for 30% of hospital costs and 20% of spending on physicians and 
clinical services (2000 National Health Expenditures data).  The lower panel of Table 8 studies 
the relationship between malpractice costs and Medicare costs per enrollee.  The IV estimates 
suggest that malpractice risk raises Medicare Part A expenditures per enrollee, but has a 
somewhat smaller impact on Part B spending, which consists of outpatient and physician 
services spending.  The elasticity for Part A spending ranges from 0.08 to 0.12.  The elasticity 
for Part B is around 0.03 to 0.06.  The evidence suggests a substantial indirect effect of 
malpractice — approximately 5-8% — on Part A spending. 
The modest size of the Part B elasticities is consistent with earlier research finding small 
overall effects of malpractice on Medicare Part B, in spite of considerable impacts on specific 
diagnostic and imaging procedures (Baicker and Chandra, 2007).  The modest size is also robust 
to the inclusion of HMO penetration variables, as shown in Appendix C.  
21 
E.1.3  Overall Effect on Costs 
By analyzing total Medicare spending and total hospital spending, we cover 
approximately 66% of total US health care spending on hospitals, physicians, and clinical 
services, which is the segment of health care spending exposed to malpractice risk.
24  Moreover, 
the uncovered portion is physician spending paid for outside Medicare.  Our analysis suggests 
that physician costs are less responsive to malpractice risk, as confirmed by other research 
(Baicker and Chandra, 2007).  Therefore, it seems plausible to assume that the effects of 
malpractice on physician costs are no higher than our estimates for hospital costs.   
Most of our estimated elasticities are quite close.  For this calculation, we focus on the 
3 − t  through  5 − t  moving average models, since those displayed the highest first-stage Wald 
statistic and are likely to display the best coverage rates as a result.  The estimated elasticity of 
malpractice on daily hospital expenditures is 0.078.  Between 1991 and 2002, medical 
expenditures grew by 34%, while malpractice payments grew by 65%.  Our point estimate would 
imply that, over this period, the growth in malpractice payments added 5.1% to the growth in 
medical expenditures, or about 15% of the total growth. 
In absolute terms, this is rather a modest effect, but disproportionate to the very small 
share of malpractice in total medical spending.  Doubling malpractice risk has a direct 2% impact 
on spending at most, but the total effect could be as high as 8%.  Therefore, doctors do change 
their behavior in response to malpractice risk, even though the latter is not a major driver of cost. 
                                                 
24 According to 2000 National Health Care Accounts data, total hospital spending was 
$417bn, and total physician and clinical services spending was $289bn.  Of the latter, $58bn was 
paid by Medicare.  Finally, according to our CMS county-level data, fee-for-service spending on 
the aged was approximately 84% of the Medicare program, in the year 2000.  Applying this ratio 
would suggest that we cover $49bn of Medicare physician spending.  
22 
E.2  Malpractice Growth and Changes in Mortality 
Faced with the threat of malpractice liability, physicians may undertake actions that limit 
risk to patients.  As such, part or all of their behavioral response may improve outcomes for 
patients.  We use our identification strategy to estimate the impact of malpractice on total 
county-level mortality rates, taken from the Multiple Cause-of-Death Mortality Data.
25   
Above, we argued empirically that our instrument is exogenous with respect to local 
trends in health care costs, which did not appear to cause variation in noneconomic damages.  
This empirical test also makes it unlikely that health-related trends in mortality cause variation in 
the instrument.  Appendix F provides further evidence on this point:  past or current mortality 
rates do not predict current noneconomic damages, but higher noneconomic damages in the past 
are significantly related to lower mortality today. 
An additional concern is the possibility that noneconomic damages influence mortality 
through channels other than malpractice.  For example, lower payoffs to litigation may 
encourage people to avoid taking risks, when adverse outcomes are less well compensated.
 26  To 
test this, Appendix F provides evidence that noneconomic damages significantly reduce non-
                                                 
25 These are taken from the National Vital Statistics System of the National Center for 
Health Statistics (NCHS).  The NCHS data provide detailed cause-of-death information on all 
deaths that occur in the United States.  We aggregate to the county level, for every year between 
1982 and 2003.  Separate death rates are calculated for:  total population, 20-64 year-olds, and 
65+ year-olds.  To protect individual privacy, county identifiers are provided only for counties 
with 100,000 people or more.  Rather than exclude these deaths, we construct an aggregate 
“small California county” and “small New York county” by using weighted means for the other 
variables. 
26 Rubin and Shepherd (2007) find that tort reform appears to reduce the number of non-
automobile accidental deaths, an effect they attribute to behavioral responses — for example, 
individuals who are less protected by the tort system may take more care.  However, they find no 
effect on auto accidents, which represent the bulk of individuals’ exposure to accident risk.   
23 
accidental deaths, but have little to no impact on accidental deaths.  There and elsewhere, 
limiting our analysis to non-accidental deaths has no quantitative impact on our results. 
We estimate the effect of malpractice risk on the total mortality rate, and deaths among 
individuals 20 to 64 or 65 and older.  We did not disaggregate by specific causes of death 
because these data fields are generally considered unreliable.  The death rate is calculated as the 
number of deaths per 1,000 members of the county population.  
The results appear in Table 9.   The elasticities for total death rates with respect to 
malpractice costs are approximately 0.02.  This implies that doubling malpractice costs lowers 
the total death rate by 2 percent.  The age-specific breakdowns suggest these effects are stronger 
for the non-elderly, although this could be due to greater statistical noise in the estimates for the 
elderly. 
Overall, the results of Table 9 provide some evidence that exposure to malpractice costs 
leads to modest reductions in mortality.  The estimates are not uniformly precise, but consistently 
negative and significant, at least for total deaths.  Still, it is hard to draw policy inferences from 
these results alone, because the confidence intervals often span ranges with inconsistent 
implications for net social benefit. 
E.3  The Welfare Consequences of Changes in Malpractice Cost 
As we argued earlier, the policy-relevant output is the number of dollars saved per life lost by 
exogenous changes in malpractice cost, or the left-hand side of expression 5.  Moreover, the 
statistical uncertainty around our estimates implies that we ought to examine the distribution of 
this parameter, not just its point-estimate.  Comparing this distribution to the value of a statistical 
life yields a conclusion about the likely welfare consequences of a given policy change.  
24 
Our approach resembles the method of “cost-effectiveness acceptability curves” (cf, 
Lothgren and Zethraeus, 2000; Fenwick et al., 2004), which calculates the empirical distribution 
of the “dollars per life lost” parameter via a bootstrap methodology (whose technical 
underpinnings are discussed in Appendix G).  This distribution then implies a probability for 
whether or not malpractice cost-reduction is cost-effective, conditional on a value of life.
27  For 
example, suppose we adopt the view that the value of a statistical life is $6m.  Suppose further 
that the “dollars saved per life lost” parameter exceeds $6m about 40% of the time.  In this case, 
lowering malpractice costs at the margin has a 40% probability of improving net social welfare.
28  
To estimate the distribution of “dollars per life lost,” we use a bootstrap approach that 
jointly estimates the variance in the estimates of costs and mortality.  We use the same bootstrap 
technique described earlier (see footnote 22), except here we use 1,000 replications, in order to 
gain more precision for the estimation of probabilities.  We separately calculate distributions for 
the total population, and for the Medicare population. 
To illustrate, we explicitly lay out the bootstrap algorithm for the Medicare analysis: 
1.  Randomly draw a county, and include all observations (years) from that county; 
2.  Repeat step 1, sampling with replacement, until the bootstrap sample of counties is 
complete; 
                                                 
27 Conceptually, this is defined over the probability space containing our estimator of dollars 
per life saved.   
28 Conceptually, we are calculating how many dollars of cost-saving per life lost are 
generated by a local average reduction in malpractice cost, due to lower noneconomic damage 
awards.  At a minimum, this evaluates noneconomic damage caps, which are one of the most 
frequent malpractice reforms mentioned.  If the local average treatment effects generalize, this 
provides insight into a broader class of reforms that limit malpractice cost.  
25 
3.  Using the bootstrap sample constructed in steps 1 and 2, estimate the model in 
equations 7 using total Medicare spending per elderly beneficiary as the outcome 
it Y .  This yields an elasticity of malpractice on Medicare costs, defined as 
CM ε . 
4.  With the same bootstrap sample used in step 3, estimate the model in 7 separately 
using county-level death rates for the over 65 population as the outcome  it Y .  This 
provides the elasticity of malpractice costs on Medicare mortality, defined as 
MM ε . 
5.  Using estimates of total nationwide deaths and costs in the year 2000,
29 dollars 
saved per life lost in the Medicare population is given by: 
 
65   Age Over     Deaths Total *






≡  (10) 
A similar procedure is used to estimate dollars per life in the overall population.  We first 
estimate the model in equations 7 using total hospital costs per bed-day
30 aggregated to the 
county level
31 as the outcome  it Y  to derive the impact of malpractice costs on hospital costs, 
denoted by 
CT ε .  Estimating the model using total county-level mortality as the outcome  it Y  then 
yields its impact on deaths, called 
MT ε .  (We must assume that our hospital cost elasticity is not 
substantially different from the elasticity for other medical costs.
32)  These are then combined 
                                                 
29 The total number of deaths in the over 65 population was approximately 1.8m.  Total 
Medicare spending was approximately $224.3bn. 
30 Using hospital costs per bed or per capita would potentially understate the costs of 
malpractice, which seems to have at least small negative effects on hospital quantity. 
31 We aggregated by taking the mean of hospital expenditures in the county, weighted by the 
number of hospital beds.  We obtain qualitatively identical results if we fail to aggregate, but it is 
computationally faster to do so. 
32 Our findings using Medicare Part B spending, which are corroborated by Baicker and 
Chandra (2007), suggest that non-hospital spending (other than non-specialty pharmaceuticals) 
responds at less than or equal to the rate of hospital spending.  Moreover, our cost measures 
account for approximately two-thirds of all health care spending exposed to malpractice risk.  In  
26 
with year 2000 data on total nationwide medical spending and total deaths, to estimate the 
aggregate impacts.
33  The estimate of dollars per life overall is: 
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≡  (11) 
We conducted 1,000 bootstrap replications.  For completeness, we repeated this procedure for all 
the various lag specifications reported in Table 8 and Table 9.  Here, we present results using the 
3 − t  through  ` 5 − t  moving average specification, as this yielded the most powerful first-stage.  
Appendix G demonstrates that the results are qualitatively similar for the other specifications, 
and across states with and without noneconomic damage caps.
34  This appendix also shows that 
the bootstrapped model yields hypothesis test results that are quite similar to the asymptotic IV 
results. 
  Figure 3 depicts the empirical cumulative distribution function for the estimated dollars 
per life saved.
35  For each dollar value, the Figure reveals the probability that dollars per life 
saved lies above that value, and thus the probability that malpractice cost-reduction is cost-
effective.  The figure can be interpreted as a “menu” of policy implications for malpractice cost-
reduction, conditional on choices for the value of a statistical life. 
                                                                                                                                                             
2000, for example, hospital spending was $417bn; spending on physicians and clinical services 
was $289bn, of which Medicare paid $58bn. 
33 The total number of deaths in 2000 was approximately 2.4m.  Total medical spending in 
that year was approximately $1.4tr. One might argue that we should use total hospital 
expenditures, but we use all expenditures to better proxy for the total impact of malpractice. 
Using only hospital expenditures would severely weaken the case for tort reform. 
34 Appendix G demonstrates that these results are robust across the states in our sample with 
(California) and without (New York) noneconomic damage caps.  This supports the anecdotal 
claim that California suffers from more litigiousness, which magnifies the cost impacts of 
malpractice and may offset the effects of its damage caps. 
35 Technically, the figure, which is truncated above at $10m, illustrates one minus the 
empirical cumulative distribution function.  
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  In the Medicare population, tort reform is more likely than not to be cost-effective for 
values of a statistical life lower than $900,000.  There is a stronger case for tort reform in the 
overall population, but it is much shakier than reliance on the borderline significance of the point 
estimates would suggest.  Reductions in malpractice costs are more likely to be cost-ineffective 
for values at or above $2.5m. 
  Using the figure to assess the desirability of reducing malpractice costs requires clarity on 
the exact value of a statistical life.  In a prominent literature review, Viscusi and Aldy locate the 
value of a statistical life within the range of $5.5m to $7.5m (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003).  In their 
study on the social value of life-extension, Murphy and Topel (2006) advocate $6.3m as a 
weighted average applicable to those aged 25 and 55.  Others have dissented markedly.  
Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) use the impact of speed limit increases on mortality to 
conclude that the value of a statistical life is bounded above by $1.5m.  Malpractice cost 
reduction has a better than even chance of being cost-effective for values lower than $2m, but is 
a poor bet for the values cited by Viscusi and Aldy, or used by Murphy and Topel.  In general, a 
nearly five-fold difference in this value makes it hard to draw unambiguous policy conclusions. 
  One way through the controversy is to follow the actual thresholds employed by US 
regulators.  The US Environmental Protection Agency typically makes decisions based on a 
value of at least $5.2m (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2002), while the Department of 
Transportation (along with the Federal Aviation Administration) most often uses $3m (U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 2002).  Perhaps most directly relevant is the $5m number often 
used by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to assess health risks.
36  All these thresholds 
                                                 
36 If Medicare used such a number, that would be most relevant of all for our purposes, but 
they are discouraged from incorporating cost-effectiveness into their approval criteria.  
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would imply that, on the margin, malpractice reform is more likely to be cost-ineffective.  
Therefore, any policymaker wishing to defend tort reform would need to depart from these 
accepted US regulatory practices, and advocate a lower value of statistical life than 
conventionally used, in order to justify their case.
37 
F.  Conclusions 
The impact of liability for medical malpractice on the cost of medical care has been one 
of the highest profile issues in debates over the U.S. health care system for many years.  
Malpractice payments have grown enormously over the past 15 years, but this has likely had a 
modest impact on the cost of health care in the US.  It may have other significant effects, such as 
decreasing the supply of physicians or changing the nature of treatment.  Our findings, however, 
suggest that limiting malpractice liability is no panacea for rising health care costs. 
Moreover, while the mortality benefits of malpractice may be quite modest, these seem 
more likely than not to justify its direct and indirect health care costs.  Therefore, we conclude 
that — for values of statistical life traditionally employed by US regulators —reducing 
malpractice costs is not likely to be a worthwhile policy goal in itself.  As emphasized by Currie 
and MacLeod (2008), however, specific policies must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, as 
they can have unexpected effects on physicians’ expected liability and incentives.  In addition, 
there may be policies that reduce malpractice costs but have other social benefits; we do not rule 
those out, but note that the case for their adoption rests on their auxiliary effects. 
At a minimum, our analysis reveals the tenuousness of the case for tort reform, but it is 
important to note its limitations.  First, we account only for impacts of tort reform on medical 
                                                 
37 Agencies often take complex views that incorporate a range of values.  The numbers 
given are “central tendencies” for each regulatory branch (Robinson, 2007).  
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costs and mortality, excluding its impacts (if any) on morbidity, physician utility, and patient 
satisfaction.  These quantities are extremely difficult to measure objectively.  In addition, we do 
not account for the adjustment costs (e.g., on the utilization of the health care system) that would 
be induced by any large-scale reform project.  The size and even direction of these excluded 
effects is not clear.  Finally, even if we ignore these limitations and accept the estimates at face 
value, the probabilistic nature of our analysis means we cannot rule with (even approximate) 
certainty for or against tort reform over conventionally accepted values of life. 
Putting our results together with earlier work suggests that malpractice may have 
substantial impacts on the care and costs of specific patient subgroups — like heart attack 
patients — but much more modest impacts on the average patient, and on health care spending as 
a whole.  Future research should endeavor to determine whether tort reform can be targeted 
toward these subgroups in a cost-effective manner. 
Another important avenue for future work is to evaluate whether malpractice has effects 
on more fine-grained outcomes in the health care system, such as morbidity, disability, or the 
nature of care delivery.  Medical costs and mortality are likely to be the first-order costs and 
benefits of changes to the malpractice system, but the auxiliary effects may be quite significant.  
If, for example, malpractice risk has had limited impacts on costs but appreciable positive 
impacts on average outcomes other than mortality, the malpractice “crisis” may be anything but.  
If, on the other hand, it has negative impacts on outcomes, the major costs of malpractice may be 
in health rather than in dollars. 
30 
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Table 1:  Geographical composition of the counties in the JVDB sample. 




Los Angeles County, CA  9,519,338  14.6% 
Cook County, IL  5,376,741  8.3% 
Harris County, TX  3,400,578  5.2% 
Orange County, CA  2,846,289  4.4% 
San Diego County, CA  2,813,833  4.3% 
Kings County, NY  2,465,326  3.8% 
Queens County, NY  2,229,379  3.4% 
King County, WA  1,737,034  2.7% 
San Bernardino County, CA  1,709,434  2.6% 
Santa Clara County, CA  1,682,585  2.6% 
Riverside County, CA  1,545,387  2.4% 
New York County, NY  1,537,195  2.4% 
Alameda County, CA  1,443,741  2.2% 
Suffolk County, NY  1,419,369  2.2% 
St. Louis County, MO  1,846,486  2.8% 
Nassau County, NY  1,334,544  2.1% 
Bronx County, NY  1,332,650  2.0% 
Sacramento County, CA  1,223,499  1.9% 
    
Rest of California  11,054,004  17.0% 
Rest of New York  8,494,928  13.1% 
Notes: The population numbers for St. Louis County include the population of 
Jefferson County and St. Charles County. 
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Table 2: Unweighted and Population-Weighted Means for Malpractice Variables. 
 
  Single Year  3-Year Moving Average 
  Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
County-Level Means      
2,949 16,837 2,772 16,613  Total Malpractice Awards 
(thousands)  (12,718) (26,590) (10,053) (21,198) 
2.87 6.07 2.04 5.77  Malpractice Awards Per Capita 
(dollars)  (18.06) (14.57)  (7.96)  (8.87) 
Verdict-Level Means      
142 312 105 292  Average Noneconomic Award:  
All Cases (thousands)  (530) (593) (299) (425) 
328 634 200 585  Average Economic Award:  
All Cases (thousands)  (2,465) (1,656)  (430)  (514) 
173 501 117 445  Average Noneconomic Award:  
Malpractice Cases (thousands)  (803) (1,120) (484)  (740) 
377 1,096 286 1,050  Average Economic Award:  
Malpractice Cases (thousands)  (2,691) (2,646)  (885)  (1,446) 
N 1,785  1,547 
Notes: The table presents means (standard deviations in parentheses) of the average total jury awards in medical malpractice 
cases, average total malpractice awards per capita, average award for noneconomic damages in all tort cases with a plaintiff 
victory (defined as a nonzero damage award), and the total amount of awards in all tort cases.  The unit of analysis is a 
county-year, or a verdict, as appropriate.  Data come from the RAND JVDB, and include all counties in New York and 
California, as well as Cook County, IL (Chicago), King County, WA (Seattle), Harris County, TX (Houston) and all counties 
in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area.  The columns reporting lagged data represent the average of three years of lags.  Data 




Table 3: Unweighted and Population-Weighted Means of Medical Expenditures, Utilization, and 
County Characteristics. 
 
 Counties  in  Sample  All  Counties 
  Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
Hospital Level Expenditures 
295 301 240 299  Hospital Facility Expenditures Per Bed  
(Thousands) (233)  (231)  (220)  (252) 
480 578 396 545  Hospital Facility Expenditures Per Bed Day  (306) (318) (299) (359) 
737 589 707 637  Total Days Per Hospital Bed  (796) (560) (821) (697) 
N 18,745  120,973 
County Medicare Expenditures 
2,220 2,512 2,226 2,385  Part A Expenditures Per Enrollee  (829) (1,041) (843)  (879) 
1,413 1,518 1,431 1,510  Part B Expenditures Per Enrollee  (528) (545) (696) (623) 
County Demographics 
21,325 25,782 17,769 22,745  Per Capita Income  (8,600) (10,209) (6,085)  (8,747) 
0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49  Fraction Male  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
0.89 0.78 0.89 0.83  Fraction White  (0.10) (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) 
0.06 0.13 0.09 0.13  Fraction African-American  (0.07) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) 
N 2,261  58,387 
Notes: The table presents means (standard deviations in parentheses) of the average cost of medical care and other 
demographic characteristics.  The unit of analysis for the hospital data is a hospital-year, and for the county-level data it is a 
county-year.  The counties “in sample” include all counties in New York and California, as well as Cook County, IL 
(Chicago), King County, WA (Seattle), Harris County, TX (Houston) and all counties in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area.  
The “all counties” data include all counties in the U.S. for which data are available.  All variables cover the time period from 





Table 4: Past Malpractice Verdicts as a Measure of Expected Malpractice Costs. 
Dependent Variable: Current Total Malpractice Payments Per Capita at year t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Individual Lagged Malpractice Verdicts Per Capita     
Coefficients       
Year t-1  3.143***  5.261***       
 (1.203)  (1.090)       
Year t-2  3.752***  5.216***  6.132***     
 (1.055)  (1.003)  (1.147)     
Year t-3  3.261***  5.145***  5.398***  6.167***   
 (1.235)  (1.179)  (1.150)  (1.236)   
Year t-4  1.277    3.764***  3.571***  4.201*** 
 (1.153)    (1.176)  (1.294)  (1.324) 
Year t-5  2.102      5.746***  5.063*** 
 (1.546)      (1.646)  (1.611) 
Year  t-6  3.934***      7.485*** 
 (1.395)        (1.562) 
Testing for equality of coefficients 
F-statistic 0.7482  0.0019  0.8278  0.7917  1.0682 
p-value 0.5877  0.9981  0.4375  0.4536  0.3444 
Regression statistics 
R
2  0.7436 0.7229 0.6998 0.6726 0.6605 
     
Moving Average of Lagged Verdicts Per Capita     
Coefficients       
17.300*** 15.623*** 15.354*** 15.391*** 16.343***  Average of Lagged 
Trial Verdicts  (1.288)  (1.081) (1.164) (1.310) (1.433) 
Regression statistics 
R
2  0.7375 0.7229 0.6957 0.6682 0.6550 
       
N  508 661 610 559 508 
Notes: The table illustrates the predicted relationship from regressions of per capita malpractice payments (from verdicts at 
trial and settlements) in the current year as the dependent variable against lagged values of per capita payments from trial 
verdicts as the independent variable.  Each column represents a separate regression, including the indicated lags.  The 
coefficients for the moving averages also come from separate regressions, with each moving average defined as the average of 
the lags included in the top part of the table in the same column.  Data come from the National Practitioner Data Bank 
(NPDB) from years 1990-2005, aggregated to the state-year level.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  A *** indicates 






Table 5: Health Costs and Noneconomic Damage Awards:  Causality Tests of the Instrument. 
 
  
  Timing of noneconomic award variable 











Year (t)  t-1, t-2,  
t-3 
t-2, t-3,  
t-4 
t-3, t-4,  
t-5 
t-4, t-5,  
t-6 
Hospital Cost Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Hospital Facility Expenditures Per Bed 
-183.970 643.497 768.325* 309.522  83.116 1,198.059***  2,393.893***  2,486.269*** 943.709  Noneconomic Award 
(Hundreds of Thousands)  (365.466) (555.175) (424.522) (439.570) (157.477)  (432.643)  (554.984)  (505.182)  (654.647) 
Dependent Variable: Hospital Facility Expenditures Per Bed Day 
-0.119 0.571  0.738 -0.346 0.059  1.161  5.242*** 4.661***  2.191  Noneconomic Award 
(Hundreds of Thousands)  (1.163) (0.950) (1.084) (0.783) (0.433)  (1.084)  (1.403)  (1.297)  (1.438) 
 
County Medicare Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Medicare Part A Expenditures Per Enrollee 
2.778 0.821 4.774 6.143 1.578  21.940**  31.916***  24.734**  24.308*  Noneconomic Award 
(Hundreds of Thousands)  (4.767) (4.811) (5.283) (7.370) (2.050)  (8.786)  (11.537)  (10.853)  (12.920) 
Dependent Variable: Medicare Part B Expenditures Per Enrollee 
1.063 1.559 2.471 3.144 1.492  10.320**  7.789*  5.117  5.195  Noneconomic Award 
(Hundreds of Thousands)  (1.985) (2.539) (2.586) (2.968) (1.178)  (4.143)  (4.572)  (4.851)  (5.317) 
               
Hospital Utilization Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Hospital Days Per Bed 
-1.332 0.024  1.779 0.232 -0.300  0.188  -4.290  -4.026  -3.932  Noneconomic Award 
(Hundreds of Thousands)  (2.250) (3.069) (2.233) (1.427) (0.559)  (1.857)  (3.501)  (2.694)  (2.472) 
               
Note: Table shows the reduced-form estimates of average noneconomic damage awards on hospital and Medicare expenditures.  Each coefficient is from a separate regression, with 
each column representing a different lag or lead for the noneconomic damages.  The unit of analysis for the top panel is a hospital-year, while for the bottom panel it is a county-
year.  County population is used as a weight in all regressions.  Other explanatory variables include hospital or county fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, as well as a quadratic for 
personal income per capita, the percent of the population that is male, white, African American, of Hispanic ethnicity, and that falls into 5-year age ranges.  Robust standard 




Table 6: The Impact of Claimed Economic Losses on Jury Awards in Medical Malpractice Cases. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 








      
Claimed Economic Losses: 
Medical  0.337** 0.380***  0.0002  0.005 
  (0.147) (0.141) (0.048) (0.050) 
      
Claimed Economic Losses: 
Non-medical  0.216  0.025  
  (0.208)  (0.066)  
      
R-squared  0.29 0.29 0.09 0.09 
Notes: Table presents the coefficients from OLS regression of different components of the compensatory jury 
award (economic and noneconomic) against claimed economic losses (medical and non-medical).  The unit of 
observation is a verdict of a malpractice case with a plaintiff “win” (i.e., a nonzero dollar amount awarded to the 
plaintiff).  Each regression has 2,328 observations.  Regressions include county-, year-, and injury type fixed-





Table 7: First-Stage Regression Relationship Between Malpractice Award Dollars Per Capita and 
Average Noneconomic Damage Awards Per Plaintiff Victory. 
 
  
  Timing of malpractice award and average noneconomic damages variables 
Three-Year Moving Average of Lagged Values 
 
Current Year 
(t)  t-1, t-2, t-3  t-2, t-3, t-4  t-3, t-4, t-5  t-4, t-5, t-6 
1.150**  0.631*** 0.620*** 0.581*** 0.517***  Malpractice Award Dollars Per 
Capita  (0.579) (0.169) (0.173) (0.161) (0.153) 
Wald Statistic  3.954**  13.885*** 12.775*** 13.028*** 11.335*** 
R
2  0.519 0.747 0.733 0.731 0.737 
N  1,785 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 
          
Notes: The table reports the estimated effect of average noneconomic damage awards in all tort cases with a nonzero award to 
the plaintiff on total malpractice awards per capita.  Each coefficient is from a separate regression, with each column 
representing a different lag for the dependent variable and the instrument.  The unit of analysis is a county-year.  The time 
periods for each regression are restricted by data availability; regressions for the current year period cover 1985-1999, the 
regression for lags 1 through 3 cover 1988-2000, the regressions for lags 2 through 4 cover 1989-2001, the regressions for lags 
3 through 5 cover 1990 to 2002, and the regressions for lags 4 through 6 cover 1991 through 2003.  County population is used 
as a weight in all regressions.  Other explanatory variables include county and year fixed-effects, as well as county personal 
income per capita, the percent of the population that is male, white, African American, and that falls into 5-year age ranges.  
Robust standard errors allowing clustering at the county level are reported in parentheses.    A *, **, or *** represents 








  Timing of noneconomic damage awards and malpractice awards 
Moving average of lagged values 
 
Current Year (t) 
t-1, t-2, t-3  t-2, t-3, t-4  t-3, t-4, t-5  t-4, t-5, t-6 
Hospital and County Medicare Cost Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Hospital Facility Expenditures Per Bed 
72.252 1,897.295*  3,863.612***  4,282.672***  1,826.520  Malpractice Awards 
Per Capita  (202.170) (1,077.975)  (1,316.800)  (1,403.649)  (2,176.261) 
Elasticity  0.002 0.037 0.072  0.076  0.030 
Dependent Variable: Hospital Facility Expenditures Per Bed Day 
0.051 1.838  8.461***  8.030***  4.241  Malpractice Awards 
Per Capita  (0.402) (2.184) (3.375)  (3.177)  (4.384) 
Elasticity  0.001 0.018 0.083  0.078  0.040 
Dependent Variable:  Medicare Part A Expenditures Per Enrollee 
1.371 34.744**  51.511***  42.605***  47.047*  Malpractice Awards 
Per Capita  (1.939)  (15.316)  (13.534) (15.102) (24.127) 
Elasticity  0.0036 0.0806 0.1162  0.0933  0.0989 
Dependent Variable:  Medicare Part B Expenditures Per Enrollee 
1.297 16.343**  12.571*  8.815 10.055  Malpractice Awards 
Per Capita (1.255) (7.399) (7.125)  (7.939)  (9.962) 
Elasticity  0.0057 0.0632 0.0470  0.0320  0.0348 
Hospital Utilization Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Total Hospital Days Per Bed 
-0.261 0.297 -6.924  -6.936  -7.609  Malpractice Awards 
Per Capita (0.654) (4.855) (7.500)  (5.757)  (6.755) 
Elasticity -0.003  0.003  -0.068  -0.066  -0.070 
Notes: The table reports the estimated effect of per capita malpractice jury award dollars on medical expenditures. In the IV models, 
malpractice awards are instrumented by the average noneconomic awards in all tort cases with a plaintiff win.  Each coefficient is from a 
separate regression, and each column represents a different lag for the malpractice variable.  The unit of analysis is a hospital-year for the 
hospital spending regressions, and a county-year for the county Medicare regressions.  County population is used as a weight in all 
regressions.  Other explanatory variables include hospital and year fixed-effects, a quadratic for per capita income, the percent of the 
population that is male, white, African-American, and that falls into 5-year age ranges.  Elasticities are evaluated at the mean values of the 
dependent and independent variables.  Robust standard errors allowing clustering at the county level are reported in parentheses.   For the 
hospital level regressions, these standard errors are calculated using 500 bootstrap replications with bootstrap resampling done at the county 




Table 9: The Impact of Malpractice on County Level Mortality. 
 
  Timing of noneconomic damage awards and malpractice awards 
  Moving average of lagged values 
 
Current Year 
(t)  t-1, t-2, t-3  t-2, t-3, t-4  t-3, t-4,t-5  t-4, t-5, t-6 
  Total Deaths Per 1,000 Population 
-0.005  -0.035* -0.026*  -0.023** -0.012  Malpractice Awards 
Per  Capita  (0.004) (0.018) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) 
Elasticity  -0.0036 -0.0258 -0.0192 -0.0171 -0.0094 
  Deaths Per 1,000 Age 20  to 64 
-0.004 -0.028**  -0.021** -0.019  -0.017  Malpractice Awards 
Per  Capita  (0.003) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) 
Elasticity  -0.0060 -0.0457 -0.0351 -0.0328 -0.0299 
  Deaths Per 1,000 Age 65 and up 
-0.016 -0.112 -0.099  -0.079*  -0.015  Malpractice Awards 
Per  Capita  (0.017) (0.080) (0.063) (0.040) (0.050) 
Elasticity  -0.0019 -0.0131 -0.0117 -0.0095 -0.0018 
Notes: The table reports the estimated effect of per capita malpractice jury award dollars on aggregate mortality rates.  Malpractice 
awards are instrumented by the average noneconomic awards in medical malpractice verdicts with a plaintiff win.  Each coefficient 
is from a separate regression, and each column represents a different lag for the malpractice variable.  The unit of analysis is a 
county-year.  County population is used as a weight in all regressions.  Other explanatory variables include county and year fixed-
effects, a quadratic for per capita income, the percent of the population that is male, white, African-American, and that falls into 5-
year age ranges.  Elasticities are evaluated at the mean values of the dependent and independent variables.  Robust standard 
errors allowing clustering at the county level are reported in parentheses.    A *, **, or *** represents statistical 




Figure 1: Physicians’ Medical Malpractice Payments and Expenditures on Physician Services. 
 
Notes:  Data on physicians’ medical malpractice payments consist of payments for settlements and 
judgments, as reported in the National Practitioners’ Databank (NPDB).  Expenditure data on physician services is 
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Figure 2: Trends in Noneconomic Damage Awards and Hospital Spending for Four Large Counties.  
44 
Figure 3:  The Welfare Impact of Reducing Malpractice Costs. 
 
 
Notes:  The curves depict the empirical probabilities that the estimated dollars saved per life lost exceed the 
given value of a statistical life.  The empirical probabilities are based on 1000 bootstrap replications of the IV 
models in equations 6, which yield elasticities of malpractice cost on county-level mortality, and separately on 
medical costs.  The results illustrated here use the three year moving average of malpractice costs lagged 3, 4 and 5 
years.  Vertical lines correspond to values of statistical life (in year 2000 dollars) used by the following federal 
government regulatory agencies:  Department of Transportation (DOT), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and 
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A.  Econometric Identification 
A.1  Consistency of Elasticity Estimates 
Assume that assumptions (A-1) and (A-2) in the text both hold.  Under these assumptions, the 
instrumental variables model in 7 yields a consistent estimate of  b 1 β .  The true elasticity of medical costs 























We have a proxy for  ) ( ct MedMal E , defined as  ct V .  If our proxy is an unbiased predictor, 
) ( ) ( ct ct V bE MedMal E = .  However, our estimator for the elasticity of medical costs with respect to 
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The argument for the mortality elasticity proceeds identically. 
A.2  Estimating Upper Bounds on Elasticities 
To simplify the algebra for the balance of this appendix, consider the residualized instrumental variables 
regression of 
* Y  on the single regressor 
* V  using the residualized instrument 
* NonEcon .  Suppose that 
assumption (A-1) holds, but assumption (A-2) does not.  In particular, suppose that 
0 ) , (
* ≥ e NonEcon Cov .  In words, growth in noneconomic damages leads to a higher forecast for 
expected malpractice costs, holding malpractice verdicts constant.  The instrumental variable estimate has 












































































                                                 
38 The standard errors will also be computed appropriately, because the model computes the standard 
error around the estimate of  b 1 β , as a whole.  
A-2 
So long as the proxy is positively related to expected malpractice costs ( 0 > b ), this expression implies 
that  | | | ) ( plim | 1 1 b b IV β β ≥ .  It then follows that the instrumental variables estimate yields an elasticity 
estimate that exceeds the true elasticity. 
A.3  Estimating Welfare Parameters 
Continue to suppose that assumption (A-1) holds, but that assumption (A-2) need not.  The object of 






.  The coefficients 
Cost
1 β  and 
Deaths
1 β  
come from the cost and mortality models, respectively. 


















































































This proves the required result. 
B.  Analysis of National-Representativeness 
The JVDB covers about one-quarter of the US population, but it over-represents large counties in the US.  
To verify that this has no undue influence on our key findings, we replicated our welfare analysis using 
statistical methods to account for the over-representation (Little and Rubin, 1987). 
  We begin by taking the full set of counties for a single year (2000) and generating a binary 
variable indicating which counties are in our analytic sample.  We then use a logistic regression to predict 
the probability of being included in our sample:  the dependent variable is the indicator for sample 
inclusion, and the independent variables are population, and county demographic characteristics (age 
distribution, income, and race).  We then use the inverse of these predicted probabilities to generate 
sampling weights.  These weights are larger on average for the smaller counties in our sample, giving 
them additional weight in the analysis. 
The sampling weights do not enter directly into our analysis.  Rather, we use them to conduct 
weighted bootstrap draws.  That is, we conduct 1,000 bootstrap replications of counties, just as before, but 
the probability of inclusion in each replication sample is proportional to the sampling weight.  The 
resulting bootstrapped sample is adjusted to be nationally representative, based on the predicted 
probability of a county being in the sample. 
Based on the bootstrapped samples, we estimate the cost and mortality effects of malpractice and 
use the full set of bootstrap replications to generate the cost-effectiveness acceptability curves.  The 
results of the weighted bootstrap analysis are illustrated in Appendix Figure 1.  The figure is nearly 
identical to before, indicating that our sample is highly representative.  From the figure it appears that 
malpractice reform is likely to be cost-effective at values of life around $1 million or less, though perhaps 
not for the Medicare population.  For the values of life used by U.S. regulatory agencies, however, 
malpractice reform appears more likely than not to reduce welfare.  
A-3 
C.  HMO Penetration 
Danzon (2000) has argued that HMO penetration can serve as a third factor that creates a spurious 
link between malpractice risk and medical costs.  She argues that HMO’s work to reduce both medical 
and malpractice costs.  Kessler and McClellan (2002a) confirm this, and find that HMO penetration 
weakens the estimated effect of tort reform on costs.  To assess the impact of this effect on our estimates, 
we included measures of HMO penetration in our models.   
The HMO data on number of enrollees in a county come from two sources.  The 1990-1994 data 
come from publications of the Group Health Association of America, whereas the 1995-2003 data come 
from Interstudy.  With both data sources, penetration is defined as the number of enrollees per people in 
the county.  See Baker (2000) for an example of these data used in past work.  
Appendix Table 1 presents the results when HMO penetration estimates are included.  Inclusion 
of the HMO data has few impacts on our estimates, which remain quantitatively stable and similar to 
those presented in the text.  If anything, the impact of malpractice appears stronger when the data on 
HMO penetration is included.  This suggests that the impact of HMO penetration operates through the 
adoption of tort reform and not through impacts on pain and suffering damage awards.   
D.  Noneconomic Awards and Malpractice Premiums 
Our use of pain and suffering awards in jury cases is based on the theory that these act as shocks 
to expectations about future malpractice costs.  Here we examine empirically whether changes in 
noneconomic damages are correlated with future changes in insurance premiums.  Appendix Table 2 
provides the estimated effect of lagged noneconomic damage awards on current malpractice premiums.  
The data on premiums come from the Medical Liability Monitor (MLM), an annual publication that 
surveys malpractice insurers about premium levels in each state.  The MLM do not publish average rates, 
rather they publish rates for three specialties: internal medicine, obstetrics and general surgery.  We run 
regressions at the insurer level, and the aggregated county-level.  The average county-level premium is 
calculated as the mean across companies reporting in a county-year; the results are essentially the same if 
the weighted average of specialties within a county-year is used as the dependent variable (where the 
weights are based on the fraction of physicians in each specialty as computed from the ARF)..  At the 
insurer level, we report results with fixed effects for county, year, and specialty, along with results that 
include fixed-effects for insurers.   
These regressions indicate a positive relationship between lagged noneconomic damages and 
premiums, but no significant relationship between current damages and current premiums.  This suggests 
that causality runs from damages to premiums, rather than in the opposite direction.  For the lags, the 
coefficients range from $650 to $1200 increase in annual premiums for every hundred thousand dollar 
increase in average noneconomic damages per plaintiff victory.  The coefficients are significant in 7 of 
the 12 specifications, and near significance in the others.  For the 5 insignificant estimates, the associated 
p-values are:  0.121, 0.124, 0.126, 0.159, and 0.165.   
 
E.  Noneconomic Damages and the Probability of Lawsuits 
The IV strategy in the paper isolates a relevant local average treatment effect if noneconomic 
damages affect the probability of lawsuits, and thus uninsurable costs for providers.  To test this 
assumption, we use California closed-claim data from a large malpractice insurer covering approximately 
20% of the California market.  These data include the number and type of claims for all policyholders 
from 1991 to 2000, as well as the county in which each physician was rated and practiced.  The data 
include information on 12,382 physicians for an average of about 11 years per physician located in 54 
counties in California. 
Appendix Table 3 presents the results from our regression analysis testing whether or not the 
probability of lawsuits faced by physicians vary with a county’s average noneconomic damage awards.   
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We estimate separate linear probability models for two dependent variables: an indicator for whether a 
physician faced any claim in a given year, and an indicator for whether a physician faced a claim in a 
given year that incurred a positive defense cost.  Physicians are required to report any event in which they 
think there is a chance someone might sue, but about 25% of the time these are resolved with no cost (i.e., 
the claim is simply dropped or never pursued).  In our data, the probability of a claim in a given year is 
17%, whereas the probability that the claim incurs some defense cost is about 13%.
39  The table reports 
results with and without physician fixed-effects.  The other demographic variables described in the text 
are also included in the regressions. 
The probability that a physician is sued is increasing in the average noneconomic damage awards 
in tort cases.  A $100K increase in noneconomic damages is associated with a 0.4 to 0.7 percentage point 
increase in the probability of a claim in a given year, for an elasticity of 0.069 to 0.138.  The coefficients 
and elasticities change little when the physician fixed effects are introduced, though the standard errors do 
increase (enough so that the impact on all claims is not significant). 
F.  Causality Test for County Level Mortality 
In the paper, we argued that noneconomic damages were not driven by medical costs or other 
factors that determine it.  This makes it unlikely that noneconomic damages are plausibly caused by 
mortality.  To ensure that this is the case, we repeat in Appendix Table 4 the Granger causality test by 
regressing the different measures of county-level mortality against lags and leads of the noneconomic 
damage award instrument.  As before, the test supports the validity of the instrument if the lags of 
noneconomic damages influence current mortality while the leads do not.  In this case we expect a 
negative relationship between lagged noneconomic awards and mortality.  The results in the table are 
consistent with the validity of the instrument.  The lags are all negative, and a handful of them are 
significant—particularly total deaths and deaths among the non-elderly adult population.  On the other 
hand, none of the leads are significant.  However, it is worth noting that the results here are not quite as 
strong as those in Table 5 for the cost regressions, because the standard errors are larger for the leads.  
This is in spite of larger sample sizes for the lead regressions, rather than the lags. 
In Table 5 we also break down results for accidental and non-accidental deaths.  The results for 
non-accidental deaths are consistent with the results for all deaths.  There is a slight inconsistency with 
accidental deaths; the correlation is positive in most cases and significant for one of the lags.  
Nevertheless, the share of accidental deaths is too small for it to have any impact on our overall findings. 
G.  Bootstrapped Cost-Effectiveness Acceptability Curves 
  In this appendix, we demonstrate and justify the conditions under which the bootstrapped 
distribution of “dollars per life saved” is a valid approximation to the true distribution.  Define 
C ε  as the 
estimator of the elasticity of malpractice with respect to medical costs, and 
M ε  as the estimator of the 
elasticity with respect to mortality.  Define 
C
0 ε  and 
M
0 ε  as their respective probability limits.  In 





.  Note, however, that all our 




.  Therefore, without loss of 
generality, we will show that this ratio’s distribution can be bootstrapped. 
                                                 
39 Note, the probability that a claim is filed that results in some kind of indemnity payment to the 
plaintiff is just 3%.  
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A sufficient condition for this result is that 
C
0 ε  is bounded away from zero.  If this is true, then 










.  In addition, provided that the underlying IV models are valid, 
both these estimators are scalar multiples of  n -consistent, asymptotically normal estimators.  This fact 





asymptotically normal.  Since the ratio of elasticities is asymptotically linear, the bootstrap provides a 
valid approximation of its distribution (Mammen, 1992; Abadie and Imbens, 2006). 
  The key condition is that 
C
0 ε  is bounded away from zero, which flows from the economics of the 
problem.  Recall that the direct effect of malpractice on medical costs is equal to the share of malpractice 
costs in medical costs,  0 > s .  Moreover, the indirect effects must be nonnegative, since providers will 
weakly spend resources (not save them) in order to avoid risks that are imposed upon them.  Risk-neutral 
providers will spend zero, but risk-averse providers will spend positive resources.  Therefore, theory 
predicts that  0 0 > ≥ s
C ε , or that the cost elasticity is bounded away from zero. 




M ε ε , or that malpractice has no true effect on costs or mortality.  If both these conditions held, 
the malpractice regime would have no costs and no benefits, rendering all policy reforms welfare-
neutral.
40  Following this polar case to its logical conclusion, our policy recommendations would be 
welfare-neutral, rendering them at least weakly welfare-enhancing, even considering the possibility of 
invalidity for the bootstrap procedure. 
Empirically, the bootstrap estimates yield hypothesis test results similar to those of the asymptotic 
IV analysis, as shown in Appendix Table 5.
41  For the sake of comparison, the table reports p-values for 
one-tailed hypothesis tests assessing whether the coefficients have the theoretically predicted sign — 
positive effect of malpractice on costs, and negative effect of malpractice on mortality.
42  The 
bootstrapped p-values are reasonably close to the asymptotic p-values.  Some departures are observed in 
the case with 1, 2, and 3 lags, where the asymptotic estimates seem to lead to over-rejection.
43 
Finally, our results are fairly similar for our different lag specifications, and fairly similar across 
states with and without noneconomic damage caps.  Appendix Figure 2 plots the empirical distribution of 
                                                 
40 One might be concerned that there are other dimensions along which malpractice could affect 
welfare.  However, all the major possibilities – e.g., morbidity, and legal costs – would have some effect 
on costs and/or mortality. 
41 Observe that the IV estimates reported here are not exactly identical to those in the paper’s tables, 
because we adjusted the samples to be entirely comparable to the bootstrap methodology.  First, small 
counties do not separately report mortality numbers.  Therefore, in calculating mortality estimates, we had 
to group small counties, as described in Section E.2.  To ensure that each pair of cost and mortality 
estimates is generated from the same sample, we use this grouping of counties prior to each bootstrap 
draw, and we do the same in constructing IV estimates of cost effects in Appendix Table 1.  Second, to 
conserve computing power in the bootstrap, we ran all analyses at the county level, by aggregating 
hospital-level data.  In Appendix Table 1, we apply this procedure to the IV estimates as well.  We found, 
using one (most preferred) model specification that the county aggregation had no quantitative impact on 
the bootstrapped distribution. 
42 As discussed in Appendix G, the bootstrap should deliver valid p-values and confidence intervals 
for these coefficients, since IV is an asymptotically linear estimator. 
43 We are operating under the view that the bootstrap distribution performs better in a finite-sample 
context, and thus serves as the “gold standard.”  
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dollars per life lost for all major lag specifications used in the paper.  Appendix Figure 3 plots the 




Appendix Table 1: HMO Penetration and the Effects of Malpractice. 
  Current Year  Lagged: 
1, 2 and 3 Years 
Lagged: 
2, 3 and 4 Years 
Lagged: 
3, 4 and 5 Years 
Lagged: 
4, 5 and 6 Years 
IV Estimates 
Hospital Cost Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Hospital Facility Expenditures Per Bed  
31.576 2,023.300*  4,164.870***  4,340.461***  1,833.339  Malpractice Awards 
Per Capita  (182.665) (1,174.366)  (1,433.954)  (1,361.019)  (2,121.661) 
Elasticity  0.001 0.040 0.079 0.077 0.030 
Dependent Variable: Hospital Facility Expenditures Per Bed Day 
0.308 -0.509  8.755***  8.276***  4.577  Malpractice Awards 
Per Capita  (0.411) (2.710) (2.981) (3.043) (4.301) 
Elasticity  0.003 -0.005 0.088 0.080 0.043 
       
County Medicare Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Medicare Part A Expenditures Per Enrollee 
1.874 22.450**  45.901***  43.848***  48.507**  Malpractice Awards 
Per Capita  (1.746)  (10.377) (13.252) (13.346) (22.806) 
Elasticity  0.0048 0.0513 0.1037 0.0961 0.1019 
Dependent Variable: Medicare Part B Expenditures Per Enrollee 
0.892 10.550* 8.201  9.325  11.068  Malpractice Awards 
Per Capita  (1.039) (6.055) (6.765) (7.303) (9.150) 
Elasticity  0.0038 0.0402 0.0307 0.0339 0.0383 
       
Hospital Utilization Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Total  Hospital Days Per Bed 
-0.510 3.396 -7.854 -7.327 -8.429  Malpractice Awards 
Per Capita  (0.785) (5.515) (7.596) (5.537) (6.352) 
Elasticity  -0.005 0.035 -0.079 -0.070 -0.078 
Notes: The table reports the estimated IV effects of per capita malpractice jury award dollars on medical expenditures. Each coefficient is 
from a separate regression, and each column represents a different lag for the malpractice variable.  The unit of analysis is a hospital-year for 
the hospital-level regressions or a county year for the county-level regression.  County population is used as a weight in all regressions.  Other 
explanatory variables include hospital or county fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, a quadratic for per capita income, the percent of the 
population that is male, white, African-American, and that falls into 5-year age ranges.  Elasticities are evaluated at the mean values of the 
dependent and independent variables.  Robust standard errors allowing clustering at the county level are reported in parentheses.   For the 
hospital level regressions, these standard errors are calculated using 500 bootstrap replications with bootstrap resampling done at the county 




Appendix Table 2: Noneconomic Awards and Malpractice Premiums. 
       
  Current Year  Lagged: 
1, 2 and 3 Years
Lagged: 
2, 3 and 4 Years
Lagged: 
3, 4 and 5 Years 
Lagged: 
4, 5 and 6 Years
  Insurer Level Regressions 
  Dependent Variable: Annual Malpractice Premium 
Noneconomic Award  
(Hundreds of Thousands) 
12.748 681.614**  584.905 768.075*  1,192.766* 
(65.794)  (336.628) (386.884) (425.067) (641.043) 
R
2  0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.81 
Fixed effects:  County, Year, Specialty 
Noneconomic Award  
(Hundreds of Thousands) 
34.814 556.848  626.990  764.533*  1,074.783* 
(47.207)  (368.333) (444.700) (448.321) (600.943) 
R
2  0.84 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.83 
Fixed effects:  Insurer, County, Year, Specialty 
   
Notes: Table reports the regressions of annual malpractice premiums against different lags of the average noneconomic 
damage awards in tort cases.  Premium data come from the Medical Liability Monitor (MLM), and are measured at the 
county-county-year level for three specialties: internal medicine, general surgery, and OBGYN.  Standard errors adjusted to 
reflect clustering by county are reported in parentheses. 
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Appendix Table 3: The Impact of Average Noneconomic Damage Awards in a County on the Probability of 
Facing a Malpractice Suit. 
 
  Any Claim  Claim with  
Defense Costs 
Noneconomic Award  
(Hundreds of Thousands) 
0.005 0.005 0.007 0.006 
(0.003)* (0.003)*  (0.003)**  (0.003)** 
Elasticity  0.055 0.068 0.093 0.111 
      
Physician fixed effects:  No Yes No Yes 
 
Notes: The table reports the estimated effect of average noneconomic jury award dollars in tort cases on the probability 
of being sued.  Sample includes claims reported against insured physicians in California who purchase their policies 
from a single large insurance company from 1991-2000. The model is estimated as a linear probability model with an 
indicator variable indicating a lawsuit reported against a physician in a year as the dependent variable.  The coefficient 
is reported for the moving average of noneconomic damage awards in plaintiff wins in tort cases lagged 1, 2 and 3 
years.  The unit of analysis is a physician-year.  County population is used as a weight in all regressions.  Other 
explanatory variables include indicators for physician specialty, physician age, year fixed-effects, a quadratic for per 
capita income, the percent of the population that is male, white, African-American, and that falls into 5-year age ranges.  
Elasticities are evaluated at the mean values of the dependent and independent variables.  Robust standard errors 
allowing clustering at the physician level are reported in parentheses.  A *, **, or *** represents statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, or 1% level, respectively. 
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Appendix Table 4: County Mortality and Noneconomic Damage Awards: Causality Test of the Instrument. 
           
 
Lead: 
4, 5 and 
6 Years 
Lead: 
3, 4 and 
5 Years 
Lead: 
2, 3 and 
4 Years 
Lead: 





1, 2 and 
3 Years 
Lagged: 
2, 3 and 
4 Years 
Lagged: 
3, 4 and 
5 Years 
Lagged: 
4, 5 and 
6 Years 
Dependent Variable: Total Deaths Per 1,000 Population 
Noneconomic Award 
(Hundreds of Thousands) 
-0.021 -0.017 -0.015 -0.015 -0.004  -0.019* -0.014** -0.012*  -0.006 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
Dependent Variable: Deaths Per 1,000 Age 20  to 64 
Noneconomic Award 
(Hundreds of Thousands) 
-0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.003  -0.015** -0.011**  -0.009  -0.007 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Dependent Variable: Deaths Per 1,000 Age 65 and up 
Noneconomic Award 
(Hundreds of Thousands) 
-0.091 -0.060 -0.043 -0.038 -0.015 -0.064 -0.060*  -0.049* -0.010 
(0.065) (0.074) (0.066) (0.054) (0.014) (0.043) (0.033) (0.027) (0.025) 
           
Dependent Variable: Accidental Deaths Per 1,000 Population 
Noneconomic Award 
(Hundreds of Thousands) 
0.0002 0.0005 0.0004 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0017** 0.0019  0.0003  0.0002 
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0005) 
Dependent Variable: Non-Accidental Deaths Per 1,000 Population 
Noneconomic Award 
(Hundreds of Thousands) 
-0.022 -0.018 -0.015 -0.015 -0.004  -0.021** -0.016**  -0.012*  -0.006 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
           
N  739 801 801 801 925 801 801 802 803 
Note: Table shows the reduced-form estimates of average noneconomic damage awards on county level mortality.  Each coefficient is from a separate regression, 
with each column representing a different lag or lead for the noneconomic damages.  The unit of analysis is a county-year.  County population is used as a weight in 
all regressions.  Other explanatory variables include county and year fixed-effects, a quadratic for per capita income, the percent of the population that is male, 
white, African-American, and that falls into 5-year age ranges.  Robust standard errors allowing clustering at the county level are reported in parentheses.  





Appendix Table 5: Distribution of Estimated Effects of Malpractice on Mortality and Cost. 
Hospital Expenditures
1, 2, 3 2, 3, 4 3, 4, 5 4, 5, 6
IV Model Coeff. 1.359 5.134 6.894 5.677
Std.Er. (1.532) (2.103) (2.338) (2.881)
Elasticity 0.0169 0.0621 0.0818 0.0645
Pr(b<0) 0.188 0.007 0.002 0.025
Bootstrap Pr(b<0) 0.313 0.008 0.008 0.051
Total Medicare Expenditures
1, 2, 3 2, 3, 4 3, 4, 5 4, 5, 6
IV Model Coeff. 48.604 63.041 48.122 53.912
Std.Er. (24.619) (21.388) (22.511) (33.659)
Elasticity 0.0705 0.0887 0.0658 0.0705
Pr(b<0) 0.024 0.002 0.016 0.055
Bootstrap Pr(b<0) 0.014 0.007 0.039 0.046
Total Mortality
1, 2, 3 2, 3, 4 3, 4, 5 4, 5, 6
IV Model Coeff. -0.035 -0.026 -0.023 -0.012
Std.Er. (0.018) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009)
Elasticity -0.0258 -0.0192 -0.0171 -0.0094
Pr(b>0) 0.026 0.032 0.011 0.091
Bootstrap Pr(b>0) 0.152 0.144 0.011 0.033
Mortality Over Age 65
1, 2, 3 2, 3, 4 3, 4, 5 4, 5, 6
IV Model Coeff. -0.112 -0.099 -0.079 -0.015
Std.Er. (0.080) (0.063) (0.040) (0.050)
Elasticity -0.0131 -0.0117 -0.0095 -0.0018
Pr(b>0) 0.081 0.058 0.024 0.382






Notes:  Table illustrates, for consistent sampling schemes, properties of IV and bootstrap estimates for effects of 
malpractice on medical costs and mortality.  For comparison, the tables report p-values for one-tailed tests of 





Appendix Figure 1:  The welfare effects of reducing malpractice costs, correcting for over-sampling 
of large counties. 
 
Notes:  The curves depict the empirical probabilities that the estimated dollars saved per life lost exceed the 
given value of a statistical life.  These are constructed identically as in Figure 3, except that in this the bootstrap is 
weighted with sampling weights that reflect the undersampling of small counties in our data.  The weights function 
in such a way that the probability of inclusion in the bootstrap is proportional to the sampling weight (which is 
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Notes:  The curves depict the empirical probabilities that the estimated dollars saved per life lost exceed the 
given value of a statistical life.  These are constructed identically as in Figure 3, except that in this figure, we include 























































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Value of a Statistical Life (Millions)
1, 2 and 3 Years 2, 3 and 4 Years
3, 4 and 5 Years 4, 5 and 6 Years























































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Value of a Statistical Life (Millions)
1, 2 and 3 Years 2, 3 and 4 Years
3, 4 and 5 Years 4, 5 and 6 Years
Lags Used in Analysis
Medicare Population 
A-14 





Notes:  The curves depict the empirical probabilities that the estimated dollars saved per life lost exceed the 
given value of a statistical life.  These are constructed identically as in Figure 3, except that in this figure, we 
estimate the model to identify an effect net of the influence of California, which had a cap on noneconomic damages 























































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Value of a Statistical Life (Millions)
1, 2 and 3 Years 2, 3 and 4 Years
3, 4 and 5 Years 4, 5 and 6 Years























































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Value of a Statistical Life (Millions)
1, 2 and 3 Years 2, 3 and 4 Years
3, 4 and 5 Years 4, 5 and 6 Years
Lags Used in Analysis
Medicare Population